Foreign Judgements and the Freedom of Speech:  Look Who\u27s Talking by Stern, Craig A.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 3 Article 4
3-1-1994
Foreign Judgements and the Freedom of Speech:
Look Who's Talking
Craig A. Stern
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Craig A. Stern, Foreign Judgements and the Freedom of Speech: Look Who's Talking, 60 Brook. L. Rev. 999 (1994).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol60/iss3/4
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND THE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: LOOK WHO'S TALKING
Craig A. Stern*
INTRODUCTION
Ajitabh Bachchan, longtime friend of countryman Rajiv
Gandhi, won a £40,000 judgment in the High Court of Justice,
London, England, in 1991. The judgment for defamation was
awarded against a wire news service and its reporter after the
High Court had instructed the jury on the English law of
defamation. But, because the English law of defamation does
not comport with current interpretations of the First
Amendment, a New York trial court refused to recognize the
judgment when Bachchan sued the wire service at its New
York home later in 1991. In Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications, Inc.,' the court found the English cause of action
repugnant to the public policy of New York.
Although the English and the American jurisprudence of
defamation differ, it is questionable whether such a difference
entails "repugnance" of the sort to bar recognition of the
English judgment in an American court. The trial court in
Bachchan failed to discuss the important conflict-of-laws and
first amendment questions that lie at the center of disputes
over the enforcement in American courts of foreign defamation
disputes. This Article discusses whether the court's judgment
might have been different had its inquiry been more searching.
The New York Bachchan decision received broad attention
in the press, hailed by one commentator as a "breakthrough"
case, one "that made legal history."2 The trial court judge,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Regent University. J.D., University of Virginia;
B.A., Yale University. The author thanks Regent University for its grant to
support the writing of this Article, and Janet Pittman, Mary Bunch, Norman
Sabin, Ricardo Giuliano and Dean Herbert Titus for their assistance and
encouragement.
154 Misc. 2d 228, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992).
2 Adam Sage, American Court Rejects English Libel Award, INDEPENDENT, Apr.
17, 1992, at 3; see also Laura R. Handman & Robert D. Balin, Bachchan v. India
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Justice Shirley Fingerhood, described the case as "the first
time that a New York court has been asked to apply
[constitutional] limitations [on libel actions] to bar enforcement
of a foreign judgment."' But Bachchan merits attention for
more than its novelty and the weight of its issues. Bachchan
suggests the notion that differences in substantive law
between a foreign rendering jurisdiction and a proposed
American recognizing jurisdiction will be considered so
repugnant to public policy as to permit, or even to require,
nonrecognition solely because those differences are based upon
American constitutional law. The outcome of Bachchan might
rest upon the notion that first amendment rights are so
fundamental as to inhere in all human beings (or even
newspapers), and thus a foreign jurisdiction that lacks a
defamation law with first amendment-type protections is per
se repugnant. Do these notions accord with the First
Amendment?
Bachchan also contains procedural implications; for
instance, it implies that, at least in this case, repugnance flows
from an erroneous choice of law in the English High Court of
Justice. Bachchan also suggests that enforcement by a New
York court changes the premises of the litigation, so that
whatever the proper choice of law in the High Court for the
High Court, enforcement by a New York court obviates that
choice and requires a different choice of law. This choice-of-law
determination relies too heavily on the identity of the enforcing
forum and, therefore, does not accord with the law of recog-
nition of foreign judgments.
All these aspects of Bachchan combine to pose one
problem: how do the conflicts principles adopted by the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("Recog-
Abroad: Non Recognition of British Libel Judgments: The American Revolution
Revisited, COMM. LAW., Fall 1992, at 1, 21-22 (counsel for India Abroad applaud
Bachchan decision and paint its political backdrop).
' Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d at 229, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661. Two scholarly articles
also have addressed the importance of Bachchan. See Kyu Ho Youm, Suing
American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16
HASTINGS COMMJENT. L.J. 235 (1994); Jeff Sanders, Comment, Extraterritorial
Application of the First Amendment to Defamation Claims Against American
Media, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 515 (1994). As this Article went to press,
a federal district court ruled in accord with Bachchan. See Matusevitch v.
Telnikofif, No. CIV.A.94-1151, 1995 WL 58741, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1995).
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nition Act") apply in the context of constitutional principles of
the dignity and primacy of the First Amendment? Resolving
this problem first requires discerning the scope of the First
Amendment-what and whose speech does it protect. Second,
it requires establishing how conflicts law accounts for forum
law when considering foreign judgments.
Part I of this Article examines the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment and argues that the
freedom is one belonging to the American people when
exercising their sovereignty. Part II reviews Bachchan and the
analysis that led the court to hold that the Free Speech Clause
bars enforcement of an English defamation award. Part III
explores the public policy exception to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, and discerns two separate
approaches to the exception. Part IV synthesizes the discussion
of the First Amendment, Bachchan, and the conflict of laws,
suggesting that Bachchan misconstrued the First Amendment,
the Recognition Act, or both.
I. PROTECTED SPEECH: WHOSE UNDER (THE) FIRST?
Bachchan determined that New York courts would violate
the First Amendment if they enforced an English judgment
against an American defendant for a defamation aimed at a
resident of England and published in England.4 Thus the
Bachchan court held the English cause of action for libel to be
repugnant to New York public policy. Before discussing the
conflict of laws, an analysis of Bachchan should consider the
text, history, and judicial interpretation5 of the First Amend-
154 Misc. 2d at 229, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
The United States Supreme Court consulted these three sources before hold-
ing that the Fourth Amendment does not reach the search by U.S. officers of the
foreign residences of a foreigner. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
258 (1990). Because Verdugo-Urquidez articulates the territorial limits of a consti-
tutional right, it is of special interest here. Some commentators have assailed
Verdugo-Urquidez as a rejection of the tradition of universal human rights that
undergirds the Constitution (and the Declaration of Independence). See Jon A.
Dobson, Comment, Verdugo-Urquidez: A Move Away from Belief in the Universal
Pre-Existing Rights of All People, 36 S.D. L. REV. 120 (1991); Gall T. Kikawa,
Case Note, Verdugo-Urquidez: How the Majority Stumbled, 13 HOUS. J. INTL L.
369 (1991); Mark L. Labollita, Note, The Extraterritorial Rights of Nonresident
Aliens: An Alternative Theoretical Approach, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 363 (1992);
Vaughan Lowe, Comment, Self-Evident and Inalienable Rights Stop at the US
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ment.6
A. The Text of the First Amendment
The text of the First Amendment itself supplies the key to
interpreting its scope. The First Amendment comprises both
free speech and free press components: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... .. Usual canons of statutory construction require us
to read these two components as distinct. However the freedom
of the press is defined, the freedom of speech is neither its
equivalent, nor a larger category embracing within it the free-
dom of the press. The suggestion that "speech" refers to
speaking and "press" means printing falters under a more
careful analysis of the text.
The text of the Free Speech Clause does not provide that
Congress make no law abridging speech or even freedom of
speech. Rather, it provides that Congress make no law abridg-
ing the freedom of speech.8 "The freedom of speech" bespeaks a
Frontier, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 16 (1991); Janet E. Mitchell, Comment, The Selective
Application of the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 29 (1991); see also David Haug, Comment, 32 HARV. INTL L.J.
295 (1991); Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1989). Presumably, to be free from unreasonable police
searches and seizures is a right all humankind is entitled to, and a constraint
upon all civil governments. To deny Verdugo-Urquidez's claim is to deny his fun-
damental human right. Because this right is protected by the Fourth Amendment,
so the argument goes, anyone should be able to assert it against the United
States government, especially when prosecuted in its courts for violating its laws.
Yet, however much the intendment of the Fourth Amendment rests upon "the
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" and universal human rights, the scope of a
constitutional right reflects other factors as well-factors such as principles of
jurisdiction and prudence. In other words, a positive law does not become univer-
sal by virtue of protecting a universal right. Perhaps the universality of the pro-
tected fundamental right counsels generosity when construing the positive right,
but this right still must be independently construed. One may fault the Supreme
Court for drawing the line where it did, but not for drawing the line.
" Bachchan involves the free speech component of the First Amendment: "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This Article will address what speech--especially whose speech and
where it is communicated-is protected by the Constitution, putting aside a more
direct inquiry into what agencies are forbidden to abridge that speech.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 This important detail has not gone unrecognized. See, e.g., William Van
Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 118
(1982).
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legal concept, a specific zone of liberty described by this term
of art.' It need not, as a term of art, be limited only to speak-
ing, just as surely as it need not be extended to all speaking.
The definite article in the term suggests that the freedom
labeled by this term of art had received some specific definition
by the time the framers had included it within the First
Amendment.
B. History of "The Freedom of Speech"
The historical context of the Constitution clarifies what
was intended to be included in "the freedom of speech." If the
freedom of speech referred to a freedom traditionally enjoyed
by the people of the United States at the time, then this free-
dom is very limited indeed.'" How did the First Amendment
work a revolution in popular liberty if the amendment uses a
term of art already familiar to its framers and, presumably, to
the common law? The answer is that the First Amendment did
not secure a novel freedom, but rather extended a preexisting
freedom to a novel class of possessors. Today, the people at
large enjoy the security of First Amendment rights, but at that
time a smaller class of people had enjoyed the freedom of
speech: Parliament."
The phrase "the freedom of speech" likely would have been
familiar to the framers, for the 1689 Bill of Rights, enacted by
Parliament and agreed to by William and Mary at their acces-
sion, stated "that the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Pro-
ceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or ques-
tioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament."' During the
9 Id. at 116.
10 See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY at vii (1960) [hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION]; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE
DARKER SIDE (1963).
"' I am indebted to Herbert W. Titus, former Dean of Regent University Law
School, for this suggestion.
1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (Eng. 1689) (emphasis added). The pedigree of the
freedom of speech guaranteed to Parliament in the 1689 Bill of Rights evokes the
ancient contest between crown and Parliament. See RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES 233-35 (1978); see also GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITU-
TIONALIS . NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 115-18 (1971). "The freedom of
speech" may differ from "debates or proceedings in parliament" by encompassing
addresses generally, while the latter category encompasses participation in actual
1003
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War of Independence, some state constitutions adopted similar
phraseology--often without the definite article-but rather
than applying the rights to their legislatures, the states se-
cured the rights to the people.'"
The substitution of popular sovereignty for parliamentary
sovereignty brought the freedom of speech for the people as a
necessary concomitant. The Constitution secures to members of
Congress that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place."14 The First
Amendment secures to the people that Congress shall not
make any law abridging their analogous right to deliberate as
the sovereign body of the civil government. Of course, the peo-
ple already possessed this right, and the Constitution had not
given Congress the power to abridge it; otherwise the Federal-
ists-among them Madison himself-could not have claimed
credibly that the Bill of Rights was a needless measure. 5
Thus, constitutional history indicates that "the freedom of
speech" is a term of art 6 that embraces a specific legal con-
cept well-known to the framers. 7
While "the freedom of speech" stands for the former parlia-
mentary right, to discern the precise meaning of "the freedom
of speech" as it appears in the First Amendment is no easy
task. The history of commentary on the First Amendment
debate and votes on specific questions. This distinction accords with the diverse
phraseology of the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I and the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.
"' See, e.g., PA. CONST. OF 1776, Decl. of Rights XII; VT. CONST. OF 1777, Decl.
of Rights X1V.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
15 See generally 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1834).
"' Terms of art used in legislation are to be understood in their technical sense
and not as the laity might understand them. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1951).
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows
and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning
its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.
Id. at 263; see also United States v. Staats, 49 U.S. 41, 44 (1850) ("when words or
terms of art are used ... that have a technical meaning at common law, these
should be followed, being the only terms to express in apt and legal language").
17 Perhaps familiarity, rather than opacity, led to the dearth of early discussion
on the meaning of this phrase.
[Vol. 60: 999
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offers an embarras de richesses that fails to provide a final
word. In general, commentators have huddled around one of
two poles. Those at one pole-the "human right" pole-have
viewed the Free Speech Clause as a guarantee of a fundamen-
tal human right to communicate.'" The other pole-the "politi-
cal right" pole-marks commentators who, more or less, hold
the Free Speech Clause to be limited to guaranteeing a free-
dom more directly analogous to that enjoyed by eighteenth-
century parliamentarians. While political right and human
right theorists may agree that the political roots of the Free
Speech Clause provide its occasion, the human rights theorists
do not agree that the political roots provide its limit. It is help-
ful to imagine these poles as marking theoretical approaches
rather than divergent sets of actual outcomes in given cases
involving supposed abridgment of the freedom of speech. For
example, theorists at the political right pole, via liberal con-
struction, may find that a rather broad range of communica-
tions ultimately furthers the political responsibility of the
people. 9 Others at this pole may find that practical matters
broaden the reach of the Free Speech Clause.0 Still others,
while emphasizing the freedom of speech as a political right,
may make their case without insisting that the clause embrac-
es only such a political role.2'
Although this is no place to rehearse the rich diversity of
scholarship on the Free Speech Clause, a representative sam-
pling of options for interpreting the Clause is particularly
" Writers often have not distinguished between the Free Speech and the Free
Press Clauses of the First Amendment, frequently labelling the content of both
together as the "freedom of expression." See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, The First
Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); David Elder, Freedom of Expression and the Law of
Defamation: The American Approach to Problems Raised by the Lingens Case, 35
INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 891 (1986); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). Although the clauses are textually
distinct, these writers offer us no practical choice but to take their remarks as
apropos free speech alone or to ignore them.
"' Professor Meiklejohn is the preeminent exponent of such a position. See infra
text accompanying notes 26-28.
21 See, e.g., Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An In-
quiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978). See
infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
2 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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useful. The survey of this scholarship presented here is com-
pressed towards the contemporary, since the most telling ef-
fects of the clause have become apparent only since the Su-
preme Court declared the First Amendment to be applicable to
state, as well as federal, governments."
The most expansive reading of the Free Speech Clause is
eloquently espoused in the work of Professor Thomas Emerson,
who postulated that the clause protects a broad "freedom of
expression" as a human right. Far from identifying the free-
dom of speech with the parliamentary right to deliberate on
matters of state, Emerson proposed four broad categories for
justifying this freedom: "(1) as assuring individual self-fulfill-
ment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of
securing participation by the members of the society in social,
including political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the
balance between stability and change in the society."' The
first of his four categories-individual self-fulfillment-most
clearly distinguishes Professor Emerson as an advocate for a
broad freedom of expression within the First Amendment:
The right to freedom of expression is justified first of all as the
right of an individual purely in his capacity as an individual. It
derives from the widely accepted premise of Western thought that
the proper end of man is the realization of his character and potenti-
alities as a human being.
... [E]xpression is an integral part of the development of
ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self. The power
to realize his potentiality as a human being begins at this point and
must extend at least this far if the whole nature of man is not to be
thwarted.
Hence suppression of belief, opinion and expression is an af-
front to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature. 4
For Emerson, the First Amendment is rooted in a fundamental
universal human right, inherent in all human beings whatever
their role in civil government. To be human is to communicate,
and the freedom of speech comprises the whole of this right to
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); see also Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). But see Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
Emerson, supra note 18, at 878-79.
2 Emerson, supra note 18, at 879.
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communicate.'
In contrast, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn espoused a
reading of the Free Speech Clause based specifically upon the
role of the people in a democratic polity. Under this theory the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment is a corol-
lary of self-government, an instrument to preserve a sovereign
people from subordination to its delegate, civil government."
At first Meiklejohn propounded a rather narrow First Amend-
ment theory:
If... as our argument has tried to show, the principle of the free-
dom of speech is derived, not from some supposed "Natural Right,"
but from the necessities of self-government by universal suffrage,
there follows at once a very large limitation of the scope of the prin-
ciple. The guarantee given by the First Amendment... is assured
only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with
which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to the consideration of
matters of public interest. Private speech, or private interest in
speech, on the other hand, has no claim whatever to the protection
of the First Amendment."
Later, however, Meiklejohn was willing to grant that the First
Amendment prohibits abridgment in such realms as literature
and the arts.28 Meiklejohn located the freedom of speech
squarely within the power of popular sovereignty but allowed
it to reach expression that serves only to lay the foundation of
sound political deliberation.
Harking back to the earlier of Meiklejohn's approaches,
Judge Robert Bork has expressed an analysis that would limit
the freedom of speech to political deliberation itself. In a fa-
' But see C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that the human right pole rightly
strips commercial speech of first amendment protection).
21 "The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the ab-
stract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues
shall be decided by universal suffrage." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND Iis RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26-27 (1948).
27 Id. at 93-94.
28 "They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response
to the values out of which the riches of the general welfare are created." Alexan-
der Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
257; see also PAUL JOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN: WORLD SOCIETY 1815-
1830, at 419 (1991) (commenting on the political nature and motivation of much of
early nineteenth-century English poetry).
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mous article-one might say "historic" considering its effect on
his nomination to the Supreme Court-Judge Bork wedded
Meiklejohn's analysis of the First Amendment to Professor
Herbert Wechsler's analysis of constitutional hermeneutics.29
Bork started with Wechsler's argument that the Court's deci-
sions must be grounded in principle. Such decisions rest upon
"reasons with respect to all the issues in a case, reasons that
in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immedi-
ate result that is involved"--the court is not to act as a "naked
power organ." 0 Finding that the freedom of speech yields
"principled" outcomes only if its content is limited to "explicitly
and predominantly political speech,""' Judge Bork endorsed
Meiklejohn's theory. But Bork stopped short of endorsing
Meiklejohn's later application of his theory to protect such
things as literature and the arts since, "[i]f the dialectical pro-
gression is not to become an analogical stampede, the protec-
tion of the first amendment must be cut off when it reaches
the outer limits of political speech."32
While agreeing with Judge Bork's analysis, Professor
Lillian BeVier has been able to discover a broader reach for
the Free Speech Clause by adverting to "pragmatic and institu-
tional concerns."" Political speech is the only communication
protected by the Free Speech Clause. Yet, rules formulated by
the Supreme Court in the course of judicial review must con-
sider more than the clause itself, and may therefore be more
generous in accounting for the rules in actual operation and
' Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
.' Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
31 Id. at 26.
32 Id. at 27.
I agree that there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior and
the publication of a novel like Ulysses, for the latter may form attitudes
that ultimately affect politics. But it is an analogy, not an identity. Other
human activities and experiences also form personality, teach and create
attitudes just as much as does the novel, but no one would on that ac-
count, I take it, suggest that the First Amendment strikes down regula-
tions of economic activity, control of entry into a trade, laws about sexual
behavior, marriage, and the like. Yet these activities, in their capacity to
create attitudes that ultimately impinge upon the political process, are
more like literature and science than literature and science are like polit-
ical speech.
Id.
BeVier, supra note 20, at 301.
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the complexity of first amendment law.' This approach, in
effect, rehabilitates Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn's "political speech"
theory need not lead in practice to Judge Bork's strictures if
courts can adopt rules of decision broader than the amendment
itself when deciding cases of abridgment.
One last sample completes this survey of First Amend-
ment scholarship. Professor Vincent Blasi proposes a theory of
the Free Speech Clause that is narrower than Meiklejohn's and
yet does not discount theories as broad as Emersons."5 For
Professor Blasi, a central purpose of the First Amendment is to
protect those who take public officials to task for perceived
breaches of the public trust. This purpose is actually narrower
than that described by Meiklejohn."6 But unlike Meiklejohn's,
Blasi's analysis serves more to focus first amendment protec-
tion than to limit it. On this point he is explicit: "Throughout
the analysis, one must keep in mind that the checking value is
to be viewed as a possible supplement to, not a substitute for,
the values that have been at the center of twentieth-century
thinking about the First Amendment."37 Blasi, then, repre-
sents scholars who propose a first amendment theory without
claiming that their theory is the only legitimate one. It also is
noteworthy that Blasi's own theory does corroborate one por-
tion of the findings from the provenance of the First Amend-
ment. Calling officers of state to account is very much a part of
the parliamentary role.
This brief review of first amendment scholarship demon-
strates that the Free Speech Clause has enjoyed no single
authoritative interpretation, and yet a range of interpretations
accords with the textual evidence adduced above. The likely
'4 See BeVier, supra note 20, at 325.
Rules broader than those required by principle respond to two concerns.
The first is a pragmatic concern that announced rules will, in their actu-
al operation, assure that speech rightfully within the purview of first
amendment principle is not subjected inadvertently to punishment or
restriction. The second is an institutional concern that rules simulta-
neously respect the very significant institutional limitations of the Court
yet sensitively respond to the factual complexity and contextual variety of
first amendment challenges to governmental action.
Id. (footnote omitted).
3 Blasi, supra note 21, at 521.
Blasi, supra note 21, at 558.
Blasi, supra note 21, at 528.
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origins of the clause support the political right theory. But
both the human right pole of Emerson and the political right
pole of Meiklejohn continue to have their adherents. Even at
the political right pole, theorists have differed over the formu-
lation of rules of decision to govern cases implicating the
clause. Thus, the scholarly understanding of the freedom of
speech yields no clear counsel.
C. Judicial Precedent on Defamation and the Freedom of
Speech
The third prong of this analysis, Supreme Court precedent,
generally is not much more revealing than commentators' work
on the question of the scope of the freedom of speech secured
by the First Amendment. Precedent has lent some protection
to nude dancing,s pornography,39 and credit reports4"; and
not because their content was political. These cases might cor-
roborate an approach such as Professor Emerson's preferred
protection for virtually all speech. At the same time, however,
other precedent has reflected more of the Meiklejohn approach
based in self-government when determining what may be
called the depth of protection rather than its breadth. That is,
in some cases the Court has adopted rules especially solicitous
of certain speech-speech at the "core" of the First Amend-
ment-forcing civil governments to give some communications
a deeper channel. These cases stand not so much for the propo-
sition that a wider range of speech is to be protected simplici-
ter; rather, they hold that some speech is so precious that to
protect it, they will grant protection to other speech not pro-
tected in its own right.
Until 1964, defamatory speech was thought to be without
first amendment protection. On this point, theorists at both
poles were in agreement,4 along with the Supreme Court.42
" Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
40 Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
41 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 18; Emerson, supra note 18, at 922-24.
On the eve of Sullivan, Meiklejohn somewhat hedged his position. See Meiklejohn,
supra note 28, at 259.
42 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Then, in 1964, the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan43 and inaugurated an entirely new era in the law
of defamation, an era that one commentator argues actually
supplanted the tort of defamation with a substitute punitive
action for the publication of falsehood.' However that may
be, it is sure that Sullivan found defamation a creature of the
common law and left it a monument of the First Amend-
ment.45
Sullivan involved a dispute between the police commis-
sioner of Montgomery, Alabama, L.B. Sullivan, and the New
York Times. Sullivan sued the Times for running an advertise-
ment that accused the Montgomery police of harassing Martin
Luther King, Jr., and his colleagues.46 Without proving much
more than this, he won a jury verdict of $500,000. The Su-
preme Court reversed on the grounds that to permit such an
award would chill the free speech necessary to criticize official
conduct and that it would be tantamount to enforcing the hat-
ed Sedition Act of 1788.48 Instead,
[tihe constitutional guarantees require... a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves [with "con-
vincing clarity"] that the statement was made with "actual mal-
ice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.49
The Court's reasoning plainly embraced the Meiklejohn
theory, with its emphasis on free speech protection for public
deliberation on public affairs directed against wayward public
officials. Sealing this affinity is the argument the Court now
founded upon its earlier decision in Barr v. Matteo." The
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 535,
535 (1988); see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 234 (1991) (general discussion and celebration of the "sea
change" begun by Sullivan).
"' For a discussion of the law of defamation on the eve of Sullivan, see Her-
bert W. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute
in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962). The pre-Sullivan common law re-
sembles the law upon which Bachchan won his English judgment.
' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
17 Id. at 256.
48 Id. at 270, 273.
41 Id. at 279-80.
50 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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Court in Barr had held that defamed private citizens must
prove that defamatory remarks by federal officials lie outside
the "outer perimeter" of the official's duties. In Sullivan, the
Court added that all states required private citizens to prove
actual malice in defamation suits against state officials. This
official privilege fosters the "fearless, vigorous, and effective
administration of policies of government." Barr was for govern-
ment officials what Sullivan was to be for citizens. The Court
asserted the importance of the "citizen-critic": "It is as much
his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer....
It would give public servants an unjustified preference over the
public they serve, if critics of official conduct did not have a
fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials them-
selves."5
Citizens hold a position in the body politic no less protect-
ed than an office of the government. The freedom of speech
secures to the citizen the right (Meiklejohn would call it a
"power") to fulfill this position. Sullivan does not hold that all
human beings have inalienable rights to communicate. Rather,
it holds that public criticism of public officials on public mat-
ters is to be protected, even at the expense of some defama-
tion.52
Following Sullivan, the Court explored the extent to which
the actual-malice standard might govern actions brought by
private citizens. Specifically, the Court considered whether a
plaintiffs status as a public "figure,"53 or the classification of
defamatory speech as concerning "matters of public or general
interest,"54 might require application of the actual malice
standard of Sullivan. Eventually, the Court determined that
suits brought by public figures and public officials are gov-
5' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282-83.
52 Justice William Brennan, Jr., who wrote for the majority in Sullivan, later
acknowledged the force of Meiklejohn's arguments and their similarity to the argu-
ments in Sullivan. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). Jus-
tice Brennan noted that a protege of Meiklejohn even more forcefully claimed that
Sullivan had adopted his mentor's theory, relating that Meiklejohn had called the
decision "an occasion for dancing in the streets.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Harry
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125).
' Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967).
14 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
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erned by Sullivan since these groups of people voluntarily
wield special authority in the polity.55 Suits brought by pri-
vate individuals, regardless of the subject matter of the defam-
atory communication, are governed by a lesser standard, un-
less presumed or punitive damages are sought." To recover
actual damages, private plaintiffs need only meet the standard
established by state law, provided that state law requires some
proof of fault and damages.57 Even this lesser standard for
defamation does not apply to actions that involve "no issue of
public concern."
55
Ultimately, the Court has recognized three levels of defa-
mation actions.59 The various depths of protection derived
from the Free Speech Clause appear to reflect, however con-
fusedly,"0 the degree to which the type of defamatory speech
fosters political self-government. Presumably, any type of
speech on any subject can foster individual self-fulfill-
ment-Emerson's view of the goal of first amendment protec-
tion.6 But the Court has not deigned to extend First Amend-
ment protection equally to all types of speech. Instead, it has
found the First Amendment to be especially solicitous of the
type of speech protected by theories at the political right
pole-the pole supported by Meiklejohn.62 In sum, defamation
precedent stands for this: the more direct the role speech plays
in the deliberation of a sovereign people, the greater the pro-
tection afforded.
D. Further Implications for Defamation
The text and early history suggest that the freedom of
speech resembles the freedom enjoyed by English parliamen-
tarians, and although scholarly interpretation of the First
" Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-44 (1973).
16 Id. at 346.
57 Id.
" Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985).
See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
60 See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outra-
geous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
62 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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Amendment admits of a broad range of theories, a prominent
set of those theories joins in this suggestion. Supreme Court
precedent may reflect a broad range of interpretations, but
when the Court struggles with the law of defamation, the sub-
ject of Bachchan, precedent has corroborated that same sugges-
tion. The freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment
is essentially the freedom of speech especially suited to mem-
bers of a sovereign people acting as such.
If the freedom of speech is not an inalienable human right
but instead a political right, a concomitant of sovereignty, for
whom does the First Amendment secure that political right?
This question requires us to explore how the people can be said
to be sovereign in the United States. Not all Americans are
permitted to vote. But the electors alone are not "the people,"
though they may be appointed to speak for "the people" at the
polls. Ultimately, "the people" in this sovereign capacity are
the whole of the polity that adopted-albeit again through
delegates-the Declaration of Independence and the Consti-
tution of the United States.63 It would seem that the First
Amendment secured the freedom of speech to members of the
fundamental polity, the body that in John Locke's analysis, for
instance, came into being by social contract and then contract-
ed with a government to which it delegated sovereignty.' In
American political theory, however, this delegation does not
take place. The people remain sovereign," under God. There-
63 See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("When in the
Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Politi-
cal Bands which have connected them with another . . . .") (emphasis added); id.
at para. 31 ("We, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme judge
of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do in the Name, and by the Au-
thority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare . . .")
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in
order to form a more perfect union . . . .") (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. X (reserving "to the people" "powers not delegated"); EDWARD A. CORWIN,
THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89 (1955); cf.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) ("the people" in the
Fourth Amendment "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national com-
munity or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community").
64 See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 168-69 (Thomas
I. Cook ed., 1947) (1690).
61 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
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fore, it is the members of this people, the American polity, who
are to enjoy the freedom of speech in order to exercise their
sovereignty.66
This cursory review of the principles of the first amend-
ment right of the freedom of speech yields an abstract conclu-
sion. The freedom of speech is a prerogative of sovereignty to
be enjoyed by members of the sovereign people as they commu-
nicate to exercise their sovereignty. This is not to deny that
there exists an inalienable right to communicate. The- Consti-
tution protects this right to some extent in the Bill of Rights 7
and perhaps to a greater extent in its structural provisions.68
Nor does this conclusion deny that the freedom of the press
protects a more varied range of speech than does the freedom
of speech.69 What this conclusion denies, however, is that the
first amendment right bf the freedom of speech indiscriminate-
ly protects all categories of communication against abridgment
by American government.
We now turn again to Bachchan, the defamation case
specifically before us for consideration. Later we shall examine
UNION 28, 598 (1868).
6 This is not to say that "the people" in their sovereign role do not benefit
from hearing the speech of those outside the polity. Members of Parliament bene-
fitted similarly. But if "the freedom of speech" is a term of art crafted to describe
parliamentary speech and not speech to parliamentarians, it would seem most
likely to possess the contours described here.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause); see also VA. CONST. OF
1776, Bill of Rights § 16; Thomas Jefferson, Act for Establishing Religious Freedom
in Virginia, in CHARLES F. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 263 app. H (1971) (1786) (to the extent speech ful-
fills a duty towards the Creator, it is a component of religion); JAMES MADISON,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE COMPLETE
JAMES MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 299, 299 (Saul K. Padover, ed., 1953) (1785)
(equating the free exercise of religion and all other fundamental rights, including
the freedom of speech, to "fundamental and undeniable truth").
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
69 Although the freedom of the press protects only against prior restraint, see
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 414-
21 (1868); LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION, supra note 10; Philip A. Hamburger,
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 949-
53 (1993), it presumably protects communications without regard to whether they
have anything to do with the sovereignty of the people. But see LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS at xi (1985) (abjuring his earlier view "that




what, if anything, the First Amendment has to do with it.
II. BACHCHAN: A TALE OF TWO CITIES
On January 31, 1990, India Abroad Publications, Inc.
("India Abroad"), wired a story from England to a news service
in India. The story, penned by a London reporter for India
Abroad, told that the Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyjeter
had reported that Swiss authorities had frozen Ajitabh
Bachchan's bank account. Various publications previously had
connected Bachchan with a kickback scheme involving arms
sales by the Swedish firm Bofars to the Indian government.
The India Abroad story reported that Dagens Nyjeter had re-
vealed that Bachchan's bank account had received transfers
from a Bofars account. Upon receiving the India Abroad wire,
the Indian news service forwarded the story to newspapers in
India. Two Indian newspapers, distributed in the United King-
dom, carried the story.7° Three days later, India Abroad wired
Bachchan's denial. Bachchan brought suit against Dagens
Nyjeter and India Abroad. Dagens Nyjeter settled their suit
and, as part of the settlement, apologized, explaining that
sources within the Indian government had misled it. India
Abroad, however, did not apologize.7'
Bachchan sued India Abroad and its London reporter72
for the wire service story that had been transmitted to India
from England. The High Court of Justice in London tried the
case before a jury under the English law of defamation, which,
according to Justice Fingerhood's later discussion in
Bachchan,73 requires only that plaintiffs prove that the defen-
dant published a statement harmful to the reputation of the
70 154 Misc. 2d at 229, 585 N.Y.S.2d at.661.
"' Id. at 229, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661-62.
72 Bachchan later added a claim against the English subsidiary of India Abroad
for distributing its New York newspaper in the United Kingdom. This claim
yielded a £40,000 judgment but was not at issue in the New York Bachchan ac-
tion. Id. at 229, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
"3 The purposes of this Article impose no need to go beyond Justice
Fingerhood's exposition of English law. To the contrary, our examination of
Bachchan for its significance to the law of conflicts and the First Amendment will
fare best if her exposition is accepted as correct. For a more thorough exposition,
see Kathleen A. O'Connell, Note, Libel Suits Against American Media in Foreign
Courts, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 147, 152-57 (1991).
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plaintiff. The plaintiff need not prove the falsity of the state-
ment or the fault of the defendant. The defendant may raise
the truth of the statement as a defense to the charge. Failure
to succeed in such a defense exposes the defendant to aggra-
vated damages. In addition, the news media may establish a
qualified privilege provided that, among other conditions, the
statement is of public concern.74 Applying this law, the Lon-
don jury awarded Bachchan a judgment for £40,000 in dam-
ages plus attorneys' fees.75
Bachchan took his London judgment to New York City,
home of India Abroad, for enforcement. He filed a motion for
summary judgment in lieu of complaint, an option granted him
by the New York version of the Recognition Act.76 Both the
Recognition Act and its New York version generally consider
such a judgment "conclusive between the parties" in such an
action.7 Availing itself of another provision of the Recognition
Act as found in the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
("CPLR"), India Abroad opposed the motion. CPLR section
5304 lists grounds upon which a court need not recognize a for-
eign money judgment,7 including when "the cause of action
on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public
policy of this state."79 India Abroad argued that the English
cause of action was repugnant to the public policy "embodied in
the First Amendment."0 Bachchan countered that the public
' Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d at 229, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 663. The precise contours of
this qualified privilege eluded Justice Fingerhood's opinion: it apparently played no
part in Bachchan's successful English action.
75 Id. at 231, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
76 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5303 (McKinney 1978).
7 UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. 265
(1962); see also N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5302.
71 "Recognition" occurs when a court treats a judgment as binding;, "enforce-
ment" occurs when a court "grants the relief ordered by the foreign judgment."
Jonathan H. Pittman, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of For-
eign Judgments, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 969, 970-71 (1989). While recognition
must accompany enforcement, collateral estoppel, for instance, may obtain if the
judgment is recognized even without enforcement. Id.
79 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5304(b)(4). The Recognition Act presents states with
two options for the quoted public policy exception. One is the "cause of action"
language adopted by New York. The other option replaces "cause of action" with
"claim for relief." UNIOiRM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §
4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. 268 (1962).
" Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d 231, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662. India Abroad raised an
issue regarding the New York Constitution as well, but the court paid little atten-
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policy exception to recognition of foreign judgments is narrow,
that New York entertains "causes of action" for defamation,
and that the American law of defamation is cognate to the
English law."'
Justice Fingerhood rejected these arguments, using as her
major premise that divergence of the English law of defama-
tion from the American constitutional standard would render
the English judgment repugnant to New York public policy,
and indeed so repugnant as to make "the refusal to recognize
the judgment. . . 'constitutionally mandatory."'82 Justice
Fingerhood focused her opinion primarily on the minor premise
that the newly-constitutionalized American law of defamation
differs from English law. Unlike the English law," American
law requires defamation plaintiffs to prove both the falsity of
the opprobrious statement and the fault-to varying de-
grees-of the defendant." Justice Fingerhood eschewed the
opportunity to classify Bachchan as a public figure and thereby
require him to prove the defendant's actual malice under
American precedents. Instead, she classified him as a private
person and the defamatory statement as "a public concern." 85
Even under such classifications, Bachchan would have had
to prove falsity and some degree of fault to recover under first
amendment precedent." The defamatory statement "Was re-
lated to an international scandal which touched major players
in Indian politics and was reported in India, Sweden, the Unit-
ed States, England and-elsewhere in the world."' That such a
statement "relates to a matter of public concern" was "obvious"
to Justice Fingerhood. 8
tion to it.
" Id. at 230, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
Id. Justice Fingerhood made an analogy to section 5304(a)(1) of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), which allows non-recognition of for-
eign judgments entered in actions where judgment was rendered without due pro-
cess. See id. One commentator has suggested that, notwithstanding the discretion
granted in section 5304(b), to refuse to recognize such a judgment "may be consti-
tutionally mandatory." Id. (quoting N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5304 commentary at
493 (McKinney 1978)).
See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
14 See supra text accompanying notes 43-58.
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As the justice discussed the two chief legal consequences of
this classification, she touched upon both her minor and major
premises. First, Justice Fingerhood stated that: "[p]lacing the
burden of proving truth upon media defendants who publish
speech of public concern has been held unconstitutional be-
cause fear of liability may deter such speech.""9 She further
expressed that the "'chilling effect' [would be] no different
where liability results from enforcement in the United States
of a foreign judgment obtained where the burden of proving
truth is upon media defendants."' Accordingly, she concluded
that Bachchan's failure to prove falsity in England's High
Court of Justice made his judgment unenforceable in New
York courts.91 Justice Fingerhood's analysis, however, went
beyond merely resting repugnance upon the difference between
English and American law. Rather, the justice's analysis con-
cluded that the effect of recognizing and enforcing the English
judgment would be to compromise first amendment protec-
tions. Justice Fingerhood discerned not just a jurisprudential
difference of constitutional magnitude, but also a constitutional
imperative to prevent her court from being used to diminish
the freedom of speech in New York.
Similar reasoning shaped her discussion of the second
major consequence of classifying the defamatory statement as
one of public concern. Justice Fingerhood found "that enforce-
ment of the English judgment would violate the First Amend-
ment: in England, plaintiff was not required to and did not
meet the... constitutional requirement that a private figure
show that a media defendant was at fault." 2
While recognizing that English and American law were
based upon similar principles, Justice Fingerhood emphasized
that England lacks an equivalent to the First Amendment.93
Thus, she stated that first amendment protections "would be
seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments
granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England
but considered antithetical to the protections afforded the
89 Id.
'o Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d 233, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
'* Id. at 234, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
, Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 235, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
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press by the U.S. Constitution."94 Once again, the repugnance
is derived not so much from the degree of difference between
the two legal regimes as from the notion that, if New York
courts recognized and enforced the English judgment, one re-
gime would invade another.
Justice Fingerhood claimed that the Constitution permits
no discretion. Whatever the New York CPLR provides regard-
ing discretionary grounds for nonrecognition 9 -- including the
"public policy exception"-the First Amendment forbids any
U.S. court from recognizing and enforcing Bachchan's English
award. Believing that to recognize and enforce the judgment
would be to chill and jeopardize free speech in New York, Jus-
tice Fingerhood denied Bachchan's motion for summary judg-
ment.96
III. JUDGMENTS AND THE POLICIES OF "PUBLIC POLICY"
The Bachchan court felt compelled not to recognize an
English defamation judgment because it found that judg-
ment-or the "cause of action" upon which it was based-to be
repugnant to the public policy of New York. Indeed, the court
found it so repugnant that to enforce it would have violated
the First Amendment.97 The exploration of the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of speech in Part I of this Article calls
into question the correctness-or at least the inexorability-of
the Bachchan court's implicit assertion that the First Amend-
ment protects speech in India or England. Furthermore, it is
debatable whether the court focused its analysis on the proper
questions.
The New York statute at issue in Bachchan was a version
of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.9
This Act, now in force in twenty-two states,99 codifies what is
" Id. at 234, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65 (emphasis added).
's N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 5304(b).
Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d 235, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
' See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
" N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5303; see also supra notes 76-81 and accompanying
text.
99 ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.100-09.30.180 (1983 & Supp. 1991); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1713-1713.8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-62-
101 to 13-62-109 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-30 to
50a-38 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-110 to 9-12-117 (Harrison 1981); IDA-
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thought to have been the general practice of the states. In fact,
a chief objective of the Recognition Act was to translate com-
mon-law precedent into statutory form to convince foreign civil
law courts that American jurisdictions recognize foreign judg-
ments, with the ultimate goal being to obtain better recogni-
tion of American judgments overseas when foreign jurisdictions
condition recognition on reciprocity.' 0 The purpose of the
Recognition Act was not to modify the law, but to manifest it.
A. Comity
The law of the recognition of foreign judgments has long
been under the sway of "comity," a doctrine embracing the
concept of a legal obligation that ranges somewhere between
binding duty and no duty at all.'0 ' Even as the schools of
vested rights, interest analysis, and others, have battled for
ascendancy in choice of law or legislative jurisdiction, the rhet-
oric of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
strangely has remained the rhetoric of comity.'0 2 This use of
HO CODE §§ 10-1401 to 10-1409 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para 5/12-618 to
5/12-626 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 626B.1-B.8 (West 1989); MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to 10-709 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 235, §
23A (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 27.995(1)-27.995(8) (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
548.35 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 511.770-511.787 (Supp.
1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-4B-1 to 39-4B-9 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1991); N.Y.
Cirv. PRAC. L. & R. 5303, 5304(b) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2329.90-2329.94 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718
(West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 24.200-24.255 (1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
22001-22009 (Supp. 1993); TEL CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001-36.008
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.6 to 8.01-465.13 (Michie
1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.40.010 to 6.40.915 (West Supp. 1994).
10 Adolf Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New
Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 370, 404 (1970).
.1 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64. Though weakened by the demise of general federal common law as
announced in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in state whether they
be local in their nature or 'general'"), and by the lapsing of the erstwhile require-
ment of reciprocity, Hilton remains the leading American authority on recognizing
and enforcing foreign judgments.
10 See, e.g., Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salar Reefer Servs., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.
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comity suggests that a judgment is less of a vested right than
are rights not reduced to judgment, surely an anomaly. Like-
wise, it suggests that the interest analysis method of assessing
the policies of rules of law and the interests of jurisdictions
somehow fails when faced with a judgment. °3 How it is that
comity survives in the realm of foreign judgments is a story
that figures prominently later in this Article.
The doctrine of comity rests upon two principles: one inter-
national, addressing the relations of civil governments, the
other personal, concerned with the rights of individuals. Comi-
ty is to have regard for proprieties at both levels."4 But still
1985) (the laws and public policy of the United States would not be violated or
infringed by granting comity to Swedish bankruptcy proceedings); Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976) (it would violate the public policy of New
York and the doctrine of comity not to recognize a Canadian bankruptcy judg-
ment); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1971) (under the doctrine of comity an English judgment permitting recovery for
breach of contract is not against the public policy of Pennsylvania), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Indus. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039 (D.
Del. 1984) (the principle of international comity that recognizes a judgment of a
foreign nation does not apply to arbitration disputes); Cooley v. Weinberger, 398 F.
Supp. 479 (E.D. Okla. 1974) (comity extends to an Iranian homicide conviction so
as to bar American Social Security benefits for the killer of the wage earner),
aff'd, 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975).
1" Comity may embrace a range of notions. As understood in Hilton, however,
it would seem inconsistent with most twentieth-century approaches in preferring
statesmanship to either jurisdiction-selecting rules or interest analysis. Comity,
understood as a system of "neutral and independent tie-breaking rules," is, to the
contrary, a subject of heated debate. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80
GEo. L.J. 53 (1991), and sources cited therein.
104 A classic article by Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman
expanded upon the policies that prompt one jurisdiction to recognize judgments
from another:
We believe that at least five policies are important: a desire to avoid the
duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsidering a
matter that has already been litigated; a related concern to protect the
successful litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, from harassing or eva-
sive tactics on the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent; a policy
against making the availability of local enforcement the decisive element,
as a practical matter, in the plaintiffs choice of forum; an interest in
fostering stability and unity in an international order in which many
aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction; and, in certain
classes of cases, a belief that the rendering jurisdiction is a more appro-
priate forum than the recognizing jurisdiction, either because the former
was more convenient as the predominantly concerned jurisdiction or for
some other reason its views as to the merits should prevail.
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions: A Survey and A Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603-04
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more fundamental considerations than these underlie comity
and, indeed, the entire subject of the conflict of laws. Ultimate-
ly, the conflict of laws is the spawn of the problem of the One
and the Many, a favorite of philosophy since before Socrates at
least.
At its most basic, the problem is posed by the simulta-
neous presence of unity and multiplicity in being, a tension
that has direct consequences on all branches of philosophy. °5
For the orthodox Christian, the problem finds its solution in
the Triune Godhead, with the equal ultimacy of both the One
and the Many. For the lawyer parsing the conflict of laws, the
most immediate presentation derives from the simultaneous
presence of the unity of (at least some) principles of justice and
the multiplicity of civil jurisdictions entrusted with the admin-
istration of those principles. On the international level, for in-
stance, principles of "duty and convenience" will be Apprehend-
ed and applied in diverse nations, as will principles of the
rights of persons on the individual level.
To the extent one embraces legal rules, one is ultimately
making some claim of universality-if not for the rules them-
selves, then at least for their deontological basis. And yet, legal
rules are diversely enforced by a multiplicity of civil
jurisdictions.0 6 Thus, conflict of laws is a jurisprudential for-
mulation of the problem of the One and the Many, with nei-
ther the One nor the Many being ultimate.
When comity is extended, a jurisdiction yields part of its
role as one of many jurisdictions in order to recognize, and
perhaps enforce, a judgment from another jurisdiction. But it
does not yield its role wholly. For example, the court presented
with a judgment must determine that it is indeed a judgment
and that a court with appropriate jurisdiction rendered it.'
(1968). Each of these five policies can be categorized under either or both of the
principles that underlie comity: concern for civil government relationships and
concern for the rights of individuals. Significantly, these policies also bear upon
the exceptions made for public policy.
" See generally ROUSAS J. RUSHDOONY, THE ONE AND THE MANY: STUDIES IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ORDER AND ULTIMACY (1971).
i" This situation in turn rests upon legal principle. See generally HAROLD
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-
TION (1983).




Essentially, in testing the judgment against such a standard,
the second court indicates its willingness to allow the claims of
the One-the claims of general legal rules founded upon pre-
supposed universal principles-to regulate the claims of the
Many-the claims of one court of a multiplicity of civil jurisdic-
tions to determine and apply the law for itself. If the judgment
departs radically from standards of justice, the second court
will accord the judgment no respect. Instead, the second court
itself will identify and apply legal principles as if it were the
only forum to do so. It will reassert the fullness of its authority
as one of the many civil authorities because the first court
departed too far from standards that the second court recog-
nizes as having sufficient universality as to apply to a foreign
judgment.
B. The Public Policy Exception
Bachchan involved the so-called public policy exception to
the recognition of foreign judgments. This exception extends to
situations where "the cause of action on which the judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of [the second]
state."' 8 In this situation a court permits the One-the uni-
versal principles of justice-to regulate the Many-the diver-
sity of civil jurisdictions-by refusing to respect the work of
another forum in order to vindicate the demands of justice.
The public policy doctrine in choice of law generally illumi-
nates the interaction of public policy and foreign judgments.
Judge Cardozo's description of the reach of the public
policy exception in conflicts cases is the traditional place to
begin such an analysis. In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., Cardozo
wrote that a court should "refuse to enforce a foreign right,"
otherwise applicable to a conflicts case, if to enforce it would
"violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
108 See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text; cf Ackermann v. Levine, 610
F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009
(E.D. Ark. 1973); Barry E. v. Ingraham, 43 N.Y.2d 87, 371 N.E.2d 492, 400
N.Y.S.2d 772 (1977); Aspinall's Club Ltd. v. Aryeh, 86 A.D.2d 428, 450 N.Y.S.2d
199 (2d Dep't 1982); In re Davis' Will, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sur.
Ct. Westchester County 1961), aff'd, 16 A.D.2d 683, 227 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't
1962).
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common weal."" 9 If the foreign law is so obnoxious as to out-
rage the forum, as to be "pernicious and detestable,""' the
forum need not apply the foreign law. This is so even among
states of the Union bound by the obligation to grant to the law
of each other "full faith and credit.""'
Without such an exception, foreign jurisdictions would
presume upon fora, forcing them to be agencies of injustice.
Cardozo's approach to the public policy exception reflects the
view that when a court finds that a foreign jurisdiction has so
erred that its law is a gross violation of justice-where perhaps
it is no law at all according to the analysis of Sir William
Blackstone"---the court will look to its own law. This ap-
proach, for convenience the Justice Approach, parallels the
approach to comity presented above."' It also is the approach
to the public policy exception that most directly yields the stat-
utory provision cited by the Bachchan court, if not the court's
analysis of that provision.
As early as six years after Cardozo described the Justice
Approach in Loucks, Professor Ernest Lorenzen argued that
the exception served a greater. function than merely as a choice-
-of-law safety valve set to open only when a foreign substantive
law outraged the view of justice held in the forum."4 He saw
in the doctrine a broader purpose: to escape, whenever appro-
priate, territorial choice-of-law rules. In this early attack on
territorialism-a harbinger of much to come-Lorenzen
claimed that the public policy exception demonstrated the
illegitimacy of territorial choice of law rules themselves."'
According to Lorenzen, public policy provides a way to bypass
territorial rules, and provides an out to courts even when oth-
erwise applicable foreign law does not meet the Loucks stan-
dard of obnoxiousness. Public policy arguments are asserted
whenever "the local interests of the state demand that its law
1- 224 N.Y.2d 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
110 Herbert F. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REv. 26,
33-34 (1938) (quoting Veytia v. Alvarez, 247 P. 117 (Ariz. 1926)).
. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971).
112 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *40-41.
1.. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
... See Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
115 Id. at 747.
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should not be allowed to be evaded.., and that its local rule
should therefore prevail.""6
Lorenzen showed that in addition to the Justice Approach
to the public policy exception there exists another. This oth-
er-which we shall call the Selection Approach-extends to
situations where a forum discerns injustice not so much in a
substantive foreign rule of law, but rather in a choice-of-law
rule that would select and apply the foreign substantive rule.
Some commentators have argued that most public policy cases
exemplify the common themes of both approaches." 7 But
sometimes the Justice Approach alone will serve to direct a
court away from applying a foreign law even in the absence of
"some important connection" between the forum and the
case."' At other times, the public policy exception may reflect
only a court's disagreement with a choice-of-law rule and not a
disagreement with a foreign substantive rule.'
116 Id. at 749 (footnote omitted). In fact, this brand of public policy exception
was to help usher in the modem approach. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395
P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
17 See Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sover, "Public Policy" in the Conflict
of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
"[Plublic policy" is one way to avoid the application of a choice of law
rule which the forum wishes to avoid. The objection of the forum, thus,
is not to the content of the foreign law but to its own choice of law rule.
Rather than to change or modify the supposedly applicable rule the court
may refuse on public policy grounds to apply the law to which the rule
makes reference. The closer the tie between the forum and the facts of a
given transaction the more readily we may expect the forum to use its
own law to judge the matter before it. In such a view the "public policy"
doctrine becomes a kind of choice of law principle, imprecise, uncertain of
application, but nevertheless discharging a choice of law function. It is a
way of saying, "In these circumstances this forum makes reference to its
internal law rather than to the law of another state to which our
'normal' choice of law rule would direct us."
The overwhelming number of cases which have rejected foreign law
on public policy grounds are cases with which the forum had some im-
portant connection. It is apparent, then, that in most cases the choice of
local rather than foreign law cannot be regarded simply as a matter of
parochialism. The common invocation of the public policy argument to
defeat a foreign claim is a denial that foreign law should govern at all
and an assertion of the forum's right to have its law applied to the
transaction because of the forum's relationship to it.
Id. at 981.
18 Id. at 972-80, 1001.
... Paulsen and Sovern suggest that courts use the Selection Approach more fre-
quently than the Justice Approach. Furthermore, in addition to the Justice and
Selection Approaches, Paulsen and Sovern note a third approach, one dedicated to
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Despite Professor Lorenzen's characterization of the public
policy exception as an escape from territorialism, the advent of
nonterritorial choice-of-law rules has not obviated the excep-
tion, or even the Selection Approach. However "flexible" the
modern theories have proven to be, and however much observ-
ers insist that these theories ought to relieve courts of the
necessity to revert to the public policy safety valve,2 the
public policy exception to even these flexible rules has been
very useful to courts, and promises to continue to be use-
ful."2 Both approaches to the public policy exception survive.
Both approaches to the choice-of-law public policy excep-
tion also are relevant to the recognition and enforcement of
judgments. In domestic cases involving states, however, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution dampens the
public policy exception. 122 Spillover from these cases may
have dampened the exception in international cases," yet
both approaches to the public policy exception have served to
justify the denial of recognition and enforcement in interna-
tional cases."M As discussed above, a court faced with a for-
eign judgment may deny comity based on repugnance to public
policy." As with the choice-of-law public policy exception
cases involving public law. But they suggest this third approach might best be
considered a part of the Selection Approach. Id. at 1003-08.
"' See, e.g., Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 395 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1979);
Holly Sprague, Note, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public Policy,
74 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1986).
1 John B. Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has
the Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 647 (1985).
122 See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Parker v. Hoefer, 2
N.Y.2d 612, 142 N.E.2d 194 (1957).
122 See Mehren & Trautman, supra note 104, at 1606-07, 1695.
124 Mehren & Trautman, supra note 104, at 1670. Mehren and Trautman advo-
cate an explicit choice-of-law analysis in cases involving foreign judgments, and
decry the confused application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause doctrine to
such cases.
11 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil
Judgments: A Summary View of the Situation in the United States, 4 INT'L LAW.
720, 729 (1970); Charles W. Joiner, The Recognition of Foreign Country Money
Judgments by American Courts, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 210-11 (Supp. 1986);
Barbara Kulzer, Some Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judgments: A Compara-
tive Summary, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 84, 96-97 (1966); Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign
Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 220, 252-54 (1972); Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judg-
ments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 796-98 (1950); Carol C.
Honigberg, Note, The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act: A Survey
1027
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
generally, this repugnance can reflect the Justice Approach or
the Selection Approach. That is, the judgment may be repul-
sive for applying either an obnoxious substantive rule of law or
an obnoxious choice-of-law rule.
126
Returning again to the principle of the One and the
Many,'27 the public policy exception to extending comity with
respect to a foreign judgment may reflect one of two different
analyses by the forum being asked to recognize or enforce a
foreign judgment. The Justice Approach applies when the judg-
ment is a gross misperception of the transcendent law, and
thus the judgment is so beyond the options available to the
Many civil governments seeking to do justice that the second
forum will assert its authority to vindicate the One-justice. In
such a situation it is not enough that the earlier judgment
differs from how the new forum would rule.2 The judgment
must be so wrong, such a violation of justice, that it works an
injustice wherever it may be given effect. Therefore, there is no
"vested right" to have such a judgment recognized. Regardless
of "contacts" or "interests" that may favor the rendering forum
over the proposed recognizing or enforcing forum, the judgment
is deemed wrong and unworthy of recognition and en-
forcement.
The Selection Approach addresses a different fault. Here,
it is not that a particular jurisdiction misperceived the One,
but rather that the particular jurisdiction supplying the sub-
stantive rule lacked authority. The judgment falters because
the civil government giving the rule of law lacked legislative
jurisdiction.1
29
of the Case Law, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 171, 186 (1981); Behrooz Moghaddam,
Note, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments-A Case for Federalization, 22 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 331, 340-41 (1987); Jonathan M. Pittman, Note, The Public Policy Excep-
tion to the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 969
(1989).
126 Reese, supra note 125, at 797-98.
" See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
128 Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114, 118
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985); Toronto-
Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Compafiia Mexicana
Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Tex. 1941), aff'd, 131
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942); Knothe v. Rose, 392 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. 1990).
1 See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text. Recognition of judgments
regarding matters of family appear most often to raise this type of public policy
exception. See Zanzonico v. Neeld, 111 A.D.2d 772 (N.J. 1955); In re Gillies' Es-
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This Selection Approach to the public policy exception with
respect to foreign judgments differs from the Justice Approach
in another important respect..In principle, the Selection Ap-
proach allows the proposed recognizing forum to reach any
error in choice of law, however slight. Thus, if it finds a dis-
crepancy between its choice-of-law rule and that embodied in
the judgment, the judgment need not be recognized. In con-
trast, the Justice Approach is based on a principle of deference
to the rendering court. The judgment must work a gross injus-
tice, a marked departure from the transcendent rule, before it
is rejected. (At the same time, a failure to approximate justice
is regarded as a greater defect than is a mistake in choosing
which civil government must lend its substantive rule to the
case.) In practice, however, the Selection Approach actually is
less powerful than the Justice Approach. The Selection Ap-
proach invites moderation, and cases have further tempered its
principles with prudence.'
The public policy exception to the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments comprises two approaches, each addressing
a distinct question. 3' The Justice Approach asks whether the
foreign judgment embodies a rule of law simply too erroneous
to enforce. The Selection Approach asks whether the foreign
judgment embodies a rule of law that, although not erroneous
itself, nevertheless is the incorrect rule to govern the case
under choice-of-law principles. We turn now specifically to how
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, New
York law, and Bachchan treat the public policy exception and
its two approaches in the presence of the First Amendment.
tate, 83 A.2d 889, 894-95 (N.J. 1951); DePena v. DePena, 31 A.2d 415, 417, 298
N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (1st Dep't 1969); In re Estate of Christoff, 192 A.2d 737, 738-39
(Pa. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 (1964); Chaudhary v. Chaudhary, 1985 Farn.
19; Formosa v. Formosa, 1963 P. 259; Lepre v. Lepre, 1962 P. 52. But see Stein v.
Siegel, 50 A.D.2d 916, 916, 377 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581-82 (2d Dep't 1975) (Austrian
automobile accident involving New York parties).
130 That is why Mehren and Trautman endorsed an explicit evaluation of the
choice of law embodied in a foreign judgment before recognition. See Mehren and
Trautman, supra note 104.
" As with the public policy exception in choice of law generally, many cases




IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN DEFAMATION
JUDGMENTS
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
casts the public policy exception to mandatory recognition and
enforcement as one that applies when "the [cause of action]
[claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant
to the public policy of this state."'32 Two commentators have
remarked, "In focusing wholly on the underlying cause of ac-
tion or claims for relief, the Act has a somewhat narrower
scope than the test of public policy generally applied by the
courts."3 ' This remark is true despite the intention of the
Recognition Act's framers to restate the law.' The Recogni-
tion Act contemplates only the Justice Approach to the public
policy exception and neglects the Selection Approach. It is the
repugnance of the substantive law itself, not the choice of that
law, that the Recognition Act contemplates.'35
The Bachchan court did emphasize the special quality of
constitutional limitations, suggesting that their importance
and dignity might make repugnance to them a case of manda-
tory nonrecognition. 3 ' But the court rested the repugnance
more clearly upon the domestic effect of recognizing the judg-
ment.3 7 This reasoning invokes the Selection Approach to the
1-2 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. 268
(1962). The bracketed language signifies alternative formulations included in the
Act.
" Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 L. & POLY INVL BuS. 37, 61
n.129 (1974).
114 See Homburger, supra note 100, at 370, 404.
" In a reported case in which a party raised an erroneous-choice-of-law argu-
ment to support the invocation of the public policy exception of section 4(b)(3), the
court declined the invitation, minimizing the degree of error. Ingersoll Milling
Mach. Co. v. Granger, 631 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1987). Before New York adopted the Recognition Act, the New York Court of
Appeals had noted: "Recognition will not be withheld merely because the choice of
law process in the rendering jurisdiction applies a law at variance with that which
would be applied under New York choice of law principles." Watts v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 279, 265 N.E.2d 739, 744, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315, 322 (1970)
(citation omitted). But see Pentz v. Kuppinger, 107 Cal. Rptr. 540 (Ct. App. 1973).
... Bachchan v. India Abroad Pubs., Inc., 154 Misc. 2d 228, 230, 585 N.Y.S.2d
661, 662 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992). But see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 614-
621 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d at 234, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
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public policy exception: it is not the repugnance of the English
law of defamation, but the repugnance of applying it in such a
way as to chill speech in New York that is the grounds of non-
recognition. The court adumbrates this approach early in its
opinion when it substitutes repugnance of the "judgment" for
repugnance of the "cause of action."" 8
The Bachchan court found the effect of enforcing the Eng-
lish judgment in the United States to be repugnant. Bachchan
does not suggest, for instance, that the First Amendment pro-
tects a fundamental, inalienable human right, infringement of
which would be such an injustice that no American court
would countenance it. The court's decision lacks a Justice Ap-
proach and any support for the idea of a universal right to free
expression.
Most likely the Recognition Act cannot be made to support
a public policy exception of the Selection Approach sort. If so,
eschewing the "universal freedom of expression" theory of the
First Amendment should end the discussion and block the
exception. The instrumental view of "the freedom of speech"
espoused above and embraced in Sullivan, is a matter of politi-
cal convention-politics and constitutions may vary. Even
those embracing popular sovereignty might assign political
rights in a manner different from our own. Unless these politi-
cal arrangements are made absolute, the English law of defa-
mation cannot be "pernicious and detestable."1"9
Hypothetically, if the Recognition Act could be made to
support a Selection Approach public policy exception, as
Bachchan appears to hold, 4 ' the question becomes whether
the High Court of Justice in England erred by applying Eng-
lish law. Considered as a defamation case, a pure tort case, it
is unlikely that the English court erred by applying its own
law to the byzantine facts of Bachchan. Presumably, English
choice of law supports that result. The First Restatement of
1- Id. at 230, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
... See Goodrich, supra note 110, at 33-34.
14 This approach to the public policy doctrine, however confused, is alive and
well in New York jurisprudence with respect to choice of law. See, e.g., Schultz v.
Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90
(1985); Corr, supra note 121, at 678-82.
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Conflicts supports it,' as does the Second.12  Interest
analysis would likely find a "true conflict," with New York law
protecting publishers like the New York defendant and English
law protecting victims of defamation like the plaintiff resident
in England and, therefore, probably support the application of
the law of the forum, England. Similarly, the unique ap-
proach of the New York courts would likely yield the conclu-
sion that English law should apply.' 4
141 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) ("Where harm is done to
the reputation of a person, the place of wrong is where the defamatory statement
is communicated.").
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 149, 150 (1971). Section
149 points to the place of publication, section 150 to the victim's domicile for
multistate defamation. While these directives are subject to the general provisions
of section 6 and its manipulable choice-of-law factors, those factors are unlikely to
require an English court to choose New York law.
"3 See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 267-70 (4th ed.
1986). Interest analysis supposedly makes the choice of law by discerning the legal
policies of the legal rule of each competing jurisdiction and whether those policies
would be advanced if the rule were applied to the particular case. If the policies
only of a foreign rule would be advanced, the foreign rule applies. Otherwise, the
rule of the forum applies. The results of the approach are far from predictable.
The results of the comparative impairment and "better rule" approaches may be
even more difficult to predict. Id. at 297-300; see also Anderson v. Hearst Pub.
Co., 120 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (holding the California retraction law ap-
plicable to a defamation committed in California by a California newspaper against
a Maryland resident, and that an action based upon out-of-state law would violate
public policy); Herma H. Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True
Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980).
Anderson received valuable attention. See, e.g, Comment, Public Policy and the
Conflict of Laws, 7 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1955). Of course, if the English court had
cast the case as a "false conflict," with only England having an interest-perhaps
by viewing defamation rules as local conduct regulation-English law plainly would
apply.
14 For example, Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d
765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970), was in part an action for invasion of privacy
brought by Ralph Nader against General Motors. Chief Judge Fuld, architect of
the contemporary choice of law for New York, opined for the court:
The District [of Columbia] is the jurisdiction in which most of the acts
are alleged to have occurred, and it was there, too, that the plaintiff
lived and suffered the impact of those acts. It is, in short, the place
which has the most significant relationship with the subject matter of the
tort charged.
25 N.Y.2d at 565, 255 N.E.2d 767-78, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 651. Bachchan "lived and
suffered" in England. The immediate acts of publication that caused him to suffer
occurred in England. Nader suggests the application of English law in Bachchan.
See also Arochem Int'l v. Buirkle, 968 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1992) (New York conflicts
law provides that the California judicial-proceedings privilege applies to defamation
in California by a New Jersey defendant of Connecticut plaintiffs because the
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The intriguing question is whether it is right to consider
Bachchan as a defamation case, a tort case pure and simple.
Apparently, the Bachchan court did not view the case this
simply. Since Sullivan,45 all American defamation cases
have entailed a first amendment analysis. If the Recognition
Act permits the Selection Approach to the public policy doc-
trine, how does the first amendment component of American
defamation law affect selection of the governing rule under
choice of law?
Justice Fingerhood decided in Bachchan that first amend-
ment considerations pointed towards the application of New
York law. The chill from the judgment would be felt in New
York. Because the First Amendment prohibits that chill, Eng-
lish law cannot apply. This untrumpeted interest analysis led
her to apply section 4(b)(3) of the Recognition Act.
The better reasoning suggests that the first amendment
considerations within defamation law militate against using
New York law here as a vehicle to apply the First Amendment.
The First Amendment-especially the First Amendment as
applied in Sullivan and its progeny-protects "the freedom of
speech," the prerogative of the sovereign people of the United
States to communicate as they exercise that sovereignty. The
First Amendment does not fundamentally and directly protect
all manner of expression regardless of person, circumstance,
and content.
In Bachchan, the American defendant addressed an Indian
audience and, eventually, an English audience. The wire story
was an English product sold to an Indian customer. While its
use in India and England were instances of expression protect-
ed by law, it was not deserving of first amendment protection;
it did not constitute, an exercise of "the freedom of speech."
Awarding damages for such speech does not chill first amend-
ment rights, so the first amendment component in the law of
defamation actually makes Bachchan, as interest analysis
would have it, a case of false conflict. That is, the policies of
the freedom of speech indicate that neither the United States
privilege regulates conduct). Accord Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F.
Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Dale Sys., Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc. 105 F. Supp.
745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
1' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1033
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
nor New York has an interest in applying the Free Speech
Clause to Bachchan, while England apparently does have an
interest in applying its law of defamation.46 The Bachchan
court was so solicitous of the First Amendment that it short-
circuited the analysis, failing to explore the First Amendment
and the conflict rules the court was using to apply it.
Yet another factor may have moved the Bachchan court to
decide as it did. The court writes that "enforcement of the
English judgment would violate the First Amendment."" 7 It
is doubtful that the enforcement by an American court of a
typical foreign defamation judgment could chill "the freedom of
speech" of the sovereign American people. If India Abroad is
subject to a foreign defamation judgment in the United States,
however, the possibility exists that the freedom of speech
would suffer for fear of overseas republication of speech spoken
domestically among sovereign Americans.
The answer to this fear is that Bachchan was not such a
case. India Abroad sent a story from outside the United States
to news agencies outside the United States. Further, the story
was published outside the United States, and defamed
Bachchan outside the United States. The First Amendment
should require that such a case be distinguished from scenari-
os such as publication within the United States, republication
elsewhere, or even publication abroad with republication in the
United States." 8 The First Amendment protects "the freedom
14 Bachchan is reminiscent of Wong 'v. Tenneco, Inc., 702 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1985),
where a California farmer sued the parent company of a California marketing
corporation after that corporation had bypassed the farmer and dealt directly with
his Mexican growers. The farmer's dealings with the growers violated Mexican
law, according to the California court. The court found that awarding the farmer
damages, even against a fellow-Californian and even regarding transactions wholly
within California, violated the principle of comity vis-a-vis Mexico. The court saw
the farmer's legal efforts as designed to circumvent Mexican law and refused to
use the public policy exception to excuse a departure from comity. Plainly, howev-
er, the court was motivated by a desire not to offend the Mexican law against for-
eign ownership of land, regardless of the normal principles of choice of law. Id. at
578-83 (dissenting opinion); see also Corr, supra note 121.
17 Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d at 234, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
14 See Kimberly Richards, Comment, Defamation Via Modern Communication:
Can Countries Preserve Their Traditional Policies?, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 613 (1990);
see also Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1408
(7th Cir. 1992). Recall that Bachchan had won a separate £40,000 judgment for
the distribution in the United Kingdom of India Abroad's New York newspaper,
but this separate judgment was not at issue in the New York Bachchan action.
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of speech," and categorical analysis should reduce whatever
first amendment chill there might otherwise be from cases like
Bachchan.
4 1
Still, the fundamental question remains: how can interest
analysis-the principle that apparently guided Justice
Fingerhood-apply New York law to a case after the English
judgment already had applied English law? The English judg-
ment plainly vindicates the English interests in the case by
compensating an English resident victim and by regulating
speech in England.15 Therefore, interest analysis-and sure-
ly the New York brand of interest analysis-does not suggest
that the English High Court erred in the choice of law. An
English forum is permitted, perhaps even required, to vindi-
cate English interests. Add to this fact the additional interest
the United Kingdom has in the recognition and enforcement of
judgments of its courts, and Bachchan is even more suspect.
Modern choice of law contemplates that some cases invite two
courts, rightly, to reach opposite choice-of-law conclusions.
Justice Fingerhood, who never explained how the English court
erred, was selective in her adherence to the modern ap-
proach.15'
CONCLUSION
The error of Bachchan is an error of authority, or rather, a
collection of errors. The New York version of the Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act authorizes a court to
deny recognition when "the cause of action on which the judg-
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy" of the forum
See supra text accompanying note 72.
"' Members of Congress have no protection from the Speech and Debate Clause
for press releases or newsletters. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). If
the Free Speech Clause is analogous to the Speech and Debate Clause, the First
Amendment should offer no protection for speech directed and received wholly
overseas.
150 See supra note 143.
... Unless, of course, the approach actually embraces an even more virulent
provincialism than Dean Ely has described. See John H. Ely, Choice of Law and
the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981)
(questioning the constitutionality and wisdom of modem choice-of-law techniques
that lead states to protect their own residents more than others).
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state. 152 But to find such repugnance between an English li-
bel judgment and the freedom of speech secured by the First
Amendment requires a court to misconstrue the First
Amendment, making the clause a universal declaration of
human rights rather than a limitation designed specifically for
American civil government. This enterprise is provincialism by
universalization.
1 53
To support Bachchan without mistaking the freedom of
speech requires the court to distort the Recognition Act and
choice of law. The Recognition Act must be made to invite a
Selection Approach to the public policy exception, not just the
Justice Approach invited by the text of the Act. Further,
choice-of-law rules themselves must be improperly employed to
undo not only the traditional teaching, but also the modern
teaching that most certainly would have allowed an English
court to apply English law to the case. Here too is provincial-
ism, a provincialism in disregard of the measure of authority
meted out by the Act and by the doctrines of choice of law.
Either way, Bachchan adds confusion to a jurisprudence al-
ready well-enough confused.
It is obvious that the presence of constitutional issues
misled the Bachchan court. Those issues led Justice
Fingerhood to find a non-existent repugnance in the English
judgment. If anything, the presence of constitutional issues
counsels a more careful analysis of conflicts principles, lest
conflicts errors become "constitutionalized." The importance of
constitutional law demands care and precision of a court, not
an over-generous enthusiasm.
152 N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. 5304(b)(4).
15 "So too, [Bachchan] may also fuel the efforts of several prominent English
lawyers to reform England's outdated libel laws and to bring them into conformity
with modern jurisprudential principles of press freedom," writes the counsel for
India Abroad. Handman & Balin, supra note 2, at 24.
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